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Wohlstadter: Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones

NOTE

MADSEN V. WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER, INC.:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION
CLINIC BUFFER ZONES

The camera focuses on a woman who faces the
clinic and, hands cupped over her mouth, shouts
the following: "God's judgment is on you, and if
you don't repent, He will strike you dead. The
baby's blood flowed over your hands . . . . An
innocent little child, a little boy, a little girl, is
being destroyed right now." Cheering is audible
from the clinic grounds. A second person shouts
"You are responsible for the deaths of children .... You are a murderer ...." The first
woman says "We will be everywhere .... There
will be no peace and no rest for the wicked ....
I pray that you will give them dreams and
nightmares, God."l

1. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2536-37 (1994) (per
Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.; per
Souter, J., concurring; per Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part;
per Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy &
Thomas, JJ.) (quoting Justice Scalia's description of part of a videotape entered
into the trial court record containing footage of demonstrations at the Florida
abortion clinic, Aware Woman Center for Choice).
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INTRODUCTION

In Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,2 the United
States Supreme Court considered whether an injunction restricting anti-abortion demonstrations outside a Florida abortion clinic unconstitutionally infringed upon protesters' First
Amendment rights. 3 The decision upheld the injunction's key
provision, a thirty-six foot "buffer zone" surrounding the clinic,
but struck down other provisions. 4
Although abortion has been legal since 1973,5 anti-abortion opponents have been active in recent years, picketing and
demonstrating extensively at clinics across the country. Rather than enduring continued disruption and distress, some of
these clinics have sought injunctions to neutralize the protest
areas. 6
Trial courts have often responded by issuing injunctions
creating "buffer zones"7 outside of clinics. 8 In assessing the
constitutionality of these injunctions, reviewing courts have
generally applied the traditional, intermediate standard used
for analyzing content-neutral injunctions and ordinances. 9
2. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
3. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. U.S. CONST. amend I provides, in part, that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
right of the people peaceably to 89semble . . . ."
4. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a qualified right to obtain abortions).
'
6. See infra note 8 for a list of cases.
7. "Buffer zones" are areas surrounding abortion clinic property lines, usually
defined by a number of feet, in which protesters are prohibited from entering or
demonstrating. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
8. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir.
1991) (sustaining injunction prohibiting all but six pickets within 500 feet of clinic); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d
681 (9th Cir. 1988) (sustaining 12 and 1/2 foot "free zone" around clinic entrance);
Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y. v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (imposing 15-foot' "clear zone" around clinic entrances and people
and vehicles seeking access thereto); Planned Parenthood v. Holy Angels Catholic
Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (establishing "no protest" zone within
25 feet of clinic entrance); Planned Parenthood v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal.
1994) (sustaining injunction banning protesters from public sidewalk outside clinic);
Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 502 N.W. 2d 536 (N.D. 1992)
(sustaining injunction providing 100-foot "protected zone" around clinic).
9. First Amendment activity is subject to different levels of protection depend-
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Madsen, however, set precedent by developing a new, stricter
standard to apply when evaluating content-neutral injunctions
in a First Amendment context. 10

This note will discuss the new standard introduced by the
United States Supreme Court, the Court's rationale behind its
introduction, and the standard's application to the facts of
Madsen. ll Next, the author will explore how this standard
will influence the decisions arid injunctions already implemented by state courts and how the standard may result in reduced
protection for women's reproductive rights. 12 Finally, the au-"
thor will explain why the states' interest in protecting clinic
access is strong enough to justify the continued use of buffer
zones despite the stricter standard courts must apply.13
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Women's Health Center, Inc., operates abortion clinics
throughout central Florida. One of these clinics, the Aware
Woman Center for Choice (hereinafter "the Clinic"), became
the site of extensive anti-abortion protests and demonstrations. 14 In September 1992, a Florida state court permanently

ing on where the activity occurs. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If it occurs in a traditional public forum, such as public
streets, sidewalks, or parks, then the government cannot deny all access to such
areas for the purpose of expressing First Amendment rights. [d. However, the
government may regulate speech-related conduct in a public forum by establishing
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
First Amendment rights in a non-public forum, however, are subject to less
protection and are analyzed under minimal scrutiny. See Perry, 460 U.S at 37.
Regulations affecting the time, place and manner of conduct will be upheld if they
are viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose.
See, e.g., International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992) (holding that airport terminals are not public forums); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding that a city bus is not a public forum).
10. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524-25. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying
text for new standard.
11. See infra notes 40-103 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 151-168 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 169-182 and accompanying text.
14. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
Women's Health Center described these demonstrations as "a sustained effort by
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enjoined anti-abortion protesters from interfering with public
access to the Clinic and from physically abusing persons entering or exiting it. 15
Despite the court order, protesters continued to interfere
with Clinic access, discouraged potential patients from entering the Clinic, and adversely affected the physical health of
Clinic patients. IS Therefore, six months after its issuance,
Women's Health Center sought to broaden the injunction. 17
The state court granted a broader injunction, finding that
protesters had disobeyed the initial order by continuing to
block Clinic access. IS Specifically, the court found that protestanti-abortion forces to shut down the only women's health clinic in Brevard County, Florida, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne." Respondent's Brief
at I, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
According to Women's Health Center, this campaign against Aware Woman Center
and other central Florida abortion clinics began in 1991 when Rescue America
sent out leaflets announcing the arrival of Operation Rescue-National in central
Florida. [d. at 1 (citing the full Record on Appeal at 9-10). A temporary injunction
was issued in 1991, after activities at the Clinic became too disruptive to Clinic
employees and patients, and a permanent injunction was issued in September
1992. [d.

15. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. The issuance of the permanent injunction was
based upon trial court findings that:
[The Protesters) are individuals and organizations, acting
in concert, who have planned a nationwide campaign
which they call "OPERATION RESCUE"... directed
towards closing down abortion clinics and providers
throughout the country . . . [and that the Petitioner Ed
Martin had) stated an intent to prevent persons from
having abortions in the Brevard and Seminole County
areas by blocking access to the clinics.
Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Madsen (No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 6-7). The
trial court further found that Martin had issued a press release announcing an
'Operation Rescue' for central Florida. [d. at 2 n.2 (citing Joint Appendix at 7).
Women's Health Center asserted that, although the protesters attempted to
distance themselves from Operation Rescue by denying that they are members of
the organization, the record is not in question. [d. at 2.
16. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. Women's Health Center observed that, not
only did protesters fail to obey the permanent injunction, but that activity against
the Clinic actually escalated after the September 1992 court order. Respondent's
Brief at 2, Madsen (No. 93-880). In the months following, the Clinic was attacked
with butyric acid, the Clinic doors were sealed with super glue, a Clinic doctor
received threats including a mock shooting, false statements were made against
the medical staff, and focused residential picketing against Clinic staff continued.
[d. at 3 (citing Joint Appendix at 54, 191, 215, 246-47, 498).
17. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
18. [d. Women's Health Center emphasized the deliberate nature of the
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ers had congregated on the paved portion of the street leading
to the Clinic, marched in front of Clinic driveways, and slowed
cars approaching the Clinic by standing in their path, approaching the cars, and attempting to give the occupants antiabortion literature. 19 The number of protesters varied, ranging from a few to four hundred. 20 The noise level also varied;
it included everything from singing and chanting to the use of
loudspeakers and bullhorns. 21
The state court found that the demonstrations were adversely affecting the health of Clinic patients. 22 A Clinic doctor testified that Clinic patients confronted by aggressive protesters were exposed to increased medical risks. 23 The doctor
explained that such patients "manifested a higher level of anxiety and hypertension causing those patients to need a higher
level of sedation to undergo the surgical procedure, thereby
increasing the risk associated with such procedures.,,24 Noise
from demonstrations was audible inside the Clinic and
stressed patients both during surgical procedures and in the
recovery room. 25 Some patients even delayed their medical
treatment by turning away from the Clinic to avoid the protesters entirely.26 The doctor further testified to the health
risks associated with such delays.27
Clinic doctors and workers were targeted at their homes as

protesters' activities: "Throughout the rest of 1992, the Rescue America newsletter,
written by Petitioners Martin and Madsen . . . continued to urge 'rescue' activity,
which was defined in this publication: The term rescue refers to blockikng Isicl
access to the entrance of abortion clinics . . . . In most cases, the clinic is shut for
the day. Many appointments do. not reschedule." Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Madsen
(No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 109, 413-15).
19. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
20. [d.
21. [d. Respondents described the situation at the Clinic as having become so
desperate that the local police captain testified that "enforcement of the injunction
would help the -police maintain public order and safety ... and that a neutral
zone would be helpful to the situation." Respondent's Brief at 8, Madsen (No. 93880) (citing Joint Appendix at 260, 299).
22. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d.
26. [d.

27. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
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well.28 Protesters picketed in front of Clinic employees' residences, informed neighbors that the employees were "baby
killers," shouted at passersby, and even confronted the children of Clinic employees who were home alone. 29
The protesters' behavior led the state court to amend its
prior order, enjoining a broader range of protest activities. 3o
The provisions of the amended injunction prohibited protesters31 at all times and on all days from 1) blocking access to or
from any Clinic building or parking lot, 2) demonstrating or
entering within thirty-six feet of the property line of the Clinic,32 3) physically approaching any person within three hundred feet of the Clinic who seeks Clinic services and does not
indicate a desire to communicate, 4) demonstrating or picketing within three hundred feet of Clinic employees' residences,
and 5) singing, chanting, using sound amplification equipment
or making other sounds or images observable within earshot of
patients inside the Clinic during the hours of 7:30 a.m.
through noon, Monday through Saturday, during surgical and

28.Id.
29. Id. One Clinic nurse, a single mother of three daughters, quit her job
because she and her children were the targets of residential picketing.
Respondent's Brief at 6, Madsen, (No. 93-880) (citing Joint Appendix at 492-521).
Although she eventually returned to work, she moved residences after a group of
15 protesters stood outside her home while two activists outside her door accosted
her daughters and urged them to convince their mother to stop working at the
Clinic and to "stop killing babies." Id. One of the children, crying, called her mother at work; the mother raced home to find "three terrified little girls." Id. (citing
Joint Appendix at 505-7). The nurse moved shortly thereafter because she felt her
family "needed to find a safe place that provided some sense of security, someplace if they did find us that at least it would not be invisible to the public." Id.
at 7 n.10 (citing Joint Appendix at 506).
30. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521. The state court concluded that "its original
injunction had proven insufficient 'to protect the health, safety, and rights of women in Brevard and Seminole County, Florida, and surrounding counties seeking
access to [medical and counseling) services .... Id.
31. The injunction was directed at petitioners, as well as "Operation Rescue,
Operation Rescue America, Operation Goliath, their officers, agents, members,
employees and servants, and ... Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall Terry ...
and all persons acting in concert or participation with them, or on their behalf."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 n.1.
32. An exception to the 36-foot buffer zone was the area immediately acljacent
to the Clinic on the east; protesters had to remain at least five feet from the
Clinic's east line. Another exception related to the record title owners of the property to the north and west of the Clinic. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522 (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669-70 (Fla. 1993».
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recovery periods. 33
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the amended injunction. 34 The court found that the injunction
was content-neutral and accordingly, applied intermediate
scrutiny, concluding that the restrictions were "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,and [left] open
ample alternative channels of communication."35 Shortly before the Florida Supreme Court announced its opinion, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit heard a separate challenge to the same injunction and
struck it down. 36
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the injunction was
content-based and accordingly, applied strict scrutiny, holding
that the restrictions were neither necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest, nor narrowly tailored to achieve
that end. 37 The Eleventh Circuit found that public safety and
order were adequately served by existing laws without having
to infringe upon the First Amendment freedoms of others.3s

33. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522-23. Other provisions of the injunction, uncontested by the protesters, prohibited them at all times and on all days from: 1)
entering the premises and property of the Aware Woman Center for Choice" 2)
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the Clinic, 3) intimidating or physically abusing any former or present Clinic doctor or worker, and 4) encouraging or
inciting other persons to commit the prohibited acts. [d. at 2522.
34. [d. at 2521 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 664).
35. [d. at 2522-23 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983». Prior to Madsen, content-neutral injunctions were analyzed
under intermediate scrutiny, the same level of scrutiny applied to content-neutral
regulations. This standards demands that the injunctions be narrowly tailored to
serve significant governmental interests and leave open ample alternative means of
communication. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984) (upholding content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation prohibiting sleeping in public park to protest homelessness).
Content-based injunctions and regulations are analyzed under strict scrutiny,
requiring that they be necessary to serve compelling governmental interests and
"narrowly drawn to achieve that end." See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
36. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th
Cir. 1993).
37. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980)
(striking down content-based ban prohibiting all residential picketing except labor
disputes». The Eleventh Circuit characterized the dispute as a clash "between an
actual prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the free exercise of
abortion rights." [d. at 711.
38. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of the state court's amended injunction. 39
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. THE INJUNCTION Is CONTENT-NEUTRAL

The Madsen Court40 began its analysis by asking whether
the injunction was content and viewpoint neutral, for the answer dictated the appropriate level of scrutiny.41 The protesters contended that, because the injunction restricted the
behavior of only anti-abortion protesters, it was necessarily
content-based, and thus deserved the strictest scrutiny.42 The
Madsen Court rejected this argument, however, finding that
the injunction targeted only the conduct, not the content, of
anti-abortion protests. 43
The Madsen Court explained that content-neutrality is
determined by asking whether the government has adopted

39. 1d.
40. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
41. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523. The guarantees of the First Amendment pro·
vide that: "[G)overnment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Nonetheless, government may regulate the time,
place, and manner of speech, provided that the regulations are not based upon the
content or subject matter of the speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
v. Public Servo Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Cantwell V.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). Thus, when a time, place, and manner
regulation is facially content-based, the government must show that the restriction
is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. See Ward V.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Because content-based regulations present risks that the government may
suppress certain ideas or discriminate on the basis of beliefs, content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny. Content-neutral regulations, by contrast, do not
present risks of governmental discrimination and thus, are subject to the less-protective intermediate scrutiny standard. See Clark V. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
42. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n V. Perry Local
Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983».
43. 1d. The Madsen Court stated: "There is no suggestion in the record that
Florida law would not equally restrain similar conduct directed at a target having
nothing to do with abortion; none of the restrictions imposed by the court were
directed at the content of petitioner's message." 1d.
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speech regulation "without reference to the content of the regulated speech.,,44 The government's purpose is the primary consideration. 45 Here, the Court found that the state court imposed the amended injunction because the protesters repeatedly violated the court's original order, not because of any invidious discrimination on the part of the ordering court.46 The injunction did not apply to pro-choice advocates because they did
not engage in disruptive demonstrations for which relief was
requested. 47 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would
render virtually all injunctions content-based. 48
Thus, the restrictions imposed upon the protesters were
incidental to their anti-abortion message, not because of their
anti-abortion message. Motives, thoughts, and ideology were
irrelevant in determining if the injunction applied to one's
behavior; engaging in activities prohibited by the injunction
was the critical factor.49 Accordingly, the Madsen Court concluded that the injunction was not content or viewpoint based,
and thus, refused to apply strict scrutiny.50 The Court then
44. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding content-neutral noise regulations».
45. [d.
46. [d. at 2524. The Madsen Court stated:
That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding
abortion does not in itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the
issuance of the order. It suggests only that those in the \
group whose conduct violated the court's order happen to
share the same opinion regarding abortions being performed at the clinic. In short, the fact that the injunction
covered people with a particular viewpoint does not itself
render the injunction content or viewpoint based.
[d.
47. [d.
48. [d. The Court elaborated:
An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities,
and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, however, because of the group's past actions in the context of a
specific dispute between real parties. The parties seeking
the injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court
hearing the action is charged with fashioning a remedy
for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a statute addressed to the general public.
[d. at 2523.
49. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2523. See Respondent's Brief at 18, Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
50. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523-24. The Court also rejected a prior restraint
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went on to discuss the applicable standard.

B.

NEW STANDARD
INJUNCTIONS

APPLICABLE

TO

SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE

Intermediate scrutiny is the standard generally used to
assess tpe constitutionality of content-neutral statutes or ordinances. 51 This standard asks whether a regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" and
leaves open adequate alternative means of communication. 52
Because the area outside the Clinic is a traditional public forum,53 the Madsen Court determined that intermediate scruti-

analysis urged by the protesters. 1d. at 2524. Although prior restraints, which
come to the court with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, often take the
form of injunctions, not all injunctions which incidentally affect expression are
prior restraints. 1d. The Court found that here, the injunction was not issued
because of the content of the protesters' expression, nor were the protesters prevented from expressing their message in a variety of ways; they were only prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. 1d. Thus, the Court found
prior restraint analysis unnecessary. 1d. at 2524 n.2. But See New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (striking down as prior restraint a ban on
publication of "The Pentagon Papers").
51. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994).
52. 1d. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold noise regulation». See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to uphold restrictions prohibiting sleeping in a public park to protest
homelessness); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold time, place, and
manner restrictions regarding the sale of literature and solicitation of funds at a
state fair).
53. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding that public sidewalks are
quintessential traditional public forums). First Amendment activity is subject to
different levels of protection depending on where the activity occurs. See Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). If it occurs in a
traditional public forum, such as public streets, sidewalks, or parks, then the government cannot deny all access to such areas for the purpose of expressing First
Amendment rights. 1d. However, the government may regulate speech-related conduct in a public forum by establishing content-neutral time, place and manner
regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
First Amendment rights in a non-public forum, however, are subject to less
protection and are analyzed under minimal scrutiny. See Perry, 460 U.S at 37.
Regulations affecting the time, place and manner of conduct will be upheld if they
are viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose.
See, e.g., International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992) (holding that airport terminals are not public forums); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding that a city bus is not a public fo-
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ny would be appropriate if the regulation at issue were a content-neutral statute. 54 The Court, however, was faced with a
content-neutral injunctive order.
Although courts have traditionally analyzed injunctions
and statutes under the same standard, the Madsen majority
decided that injunctions in a First Amendment context require
a higher degree of scrutiny than that used for generally-applicable statutes. 55 Therefore, the Court created a new, more
demanding standard to apply when assessing the constitutionality of speech-restrictive inj unctions. 56
The Court justified this stricter standard by explaining the
differences between injunctions and ordinances. 57 Whereas
ordinances are passed by legislatures and are imposed indiscriminately upon the public as a whole, injunctions are issued
upon identified groups of wrongdoers, and thus carry "greater
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do
general ordinances."56 The Court concluded that this risk justified a "somewhat more stringent application of general First
Amendment principles in this context. "59

rum).
54. Madsen, 114 s. Ct. at 2524.
55. [d. at 2524-25.
56. See id. at 2525.
57. [d. at 2524 ("Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree.").
58. [d. (finding that "there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally") (quoting
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949».
59. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. The majority acknowledged that Justice
Stevens and Justice Scalia disagreed with the new standard, but asserted that
"consideration of all of the differences and similarities between statutes and injunctions supports, as a matter of policy, the standard we apply here." [d. at
2525. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text for the standard Justice
Stevens would apply. See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text for the standard Justice Scalia would apply.
The majority rejected Justice Scalia's argument that precedent compelled the
application of strict scrutiny. The majority asserted that they knew of no case, nor
did Justice Scalia cite any case, in which strict scrutiny was applied to a contentneutral injunction. [d.
The majority also disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention that the cases
cited by the majority supporting their new standard actually advocate strict scrutiny. [d. Specifically, Justice Scalia believed that the standard adopted in Carroll v.
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The Court described the new standard as more rigorous
than intermediate scrutiny, but not as stringent as strict scrutiny.so Rather than merely requiring that an injunction be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest, the new
standard demands that "provisions of the injunction burden no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest. mll This level of scrutiny requires more precise tailoring than intermediate scrutiny.62
C.

SIGNIFICANT STATE INTERESTS EXIST

Having articulated the new standard for injunctions, the
Madsen Court proceeded to apply it to the case at hand. Before examining the individual injunction provisions, however,
the Court identified and evaluated the proposed state interests. The Madsen Court agreed with the Florida Supreme
Court's determination that the injunction promoted a number
of significant state interests. 63 The injunction served the
strong state interest in "protecting a woman's freedom to seek
lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her

President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) is strict scrutiny, which he felt "does not remotely resemble the Court's new proposal." Madsen,
114 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While
Carroll requires that an injunction be "couched in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish the pin-pointed objective" of the injunction, the new standard requires
that an injunction "burden no more speech than necessary" to accomplish its goals.
ld. at 2526. The majority "failled) to see a difference between the two standards."
ld.
60. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
61. ld. at 2525 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)). The Court explained that
this standard is consistent with the principle that injunctions be no broader than
necessary to achieve their desired goals:
Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an
injunction and the restrictions it imposes on speech is
consistent with the general rule, quite apart from First
Amendment considerations, "that injunctive relief should
be no more burdensome to the defendants than necessary
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979)).
62. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
63. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994).
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pregnancy."64 The injunction also furthered the state's interest in securing public safety, promoting the free flow of traffic
on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting citizens' property rights. 65
Lastly, the Court acknowledged that the governmental
interest in residential privacy extends to medical privacy as
well. 66 The Court agreed with the Florida Supreme Court's
finding: "While targeted picketing of the home threatens the
psychological well-being of the 'captive' resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but the physical well-being of the patient held 'captive' by
medical circumstance."67 The Madsen Court concluded that a
combination of these state interests clearly justified an "appropriately tailored" injunction. 66 The Court then proceeded to
examine each contested injunction provision, determining
whether it "burden[ed] more speech than necessary to accomplish its goal."69
D.

Do THE INJUNCTION PROVISIONS "BURDEN MORE SPEECH
THAN NECESSARY" To ACCOMPLISH THEIR GoALS?

1.

The Thirty-Six Foot Buffer Zone

The thirty-six foot buffer zone prohibited protesters from
"congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering"
any part of the public or private property within 36 feet of the
clinic's property line. "70 In effect, this provision required the
protesters to move from the Clinic driveway to the opposite
64. 1d. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

65. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health
Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla. 1993».
66. 1d. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban on targeted
residential picketing).
67. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 673).
See Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st and
2nd Sess., 1, 3, 130 (1987) (medical staff at clinics testifying before Congress about
how psychological stress from aggressive anti-abortion demonstrations complicates
medical treatment and compromises patients' subsequent recovery).
68. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
69. 1d.
70. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994) (citing
Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 669).
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side of the street. 71
The majority found that "[t]he 36-foot buffer zone protecting the entrances to the clinic and the parking lot is a means
of protecting unfettered ingress to and egress from the clinic,
and ensuring that [the protesters] do not block traffic .... "72
The Court noted that, due to the narrow confines surrounding
the Clinic, the trial court faced limited options to protect safe
access to the building. 73 Because the protesters disobeyed the
first injunction by interfering with such access, the state court
decided that the protesters should not remain on the Clinic
sidewalk or driveway, nor should they be allowed to stand in
the middle of the street blocking traffic. 74
The Madsen Court noted that the buffer zone did not eliminate all avenues of communication near the Clinic. Protesters
could still get as close as ten to twelve feet to cars approaching
the Clinic, and even from across the street, protesters could be
seen and heard by people in the Clinic parking lots. 75 The
Madsen majority concluded that, in light of the continuing
need to maintain Clinic access and the protesters' failure to
follow the first court order, the thirty-six foot buffer zone "burdened no more speech than necessary" to accomplish the

71. [d. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (sustaining statute prohibiting picketers from obstructing or unreasonably interfering with access to and
from public buildings, including courthouses, and with traffic on adjacent street
sidewalks).
72. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
73. [d. The Florida Supreme Court had observed that the street is only 21
feet wide in the area of the Clinic. [d. The Madsen Court found that "[tjhe state
court was convinced that allowing the petitioners to remain on the clinic's sidewalk and driveway was not a viable option in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect access." [d.
74. [d. ("We also bear in mind the fact that the state court originally issued a
much narrower injunction, providing no buffer zone, and that this order did not
succeed in protecting access to the clinic. The failure of this first order to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration in evaluating the constitutionality of the broader order.") (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1978».
The Madsen Court conceded that "[tjhe need for a complete buffer zone near
the clinic entrances and driveway may be debatable," but explained that "some
deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with the facts ...."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941)).
75. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
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state's goals. 76
Nonetheless, the Court struck down part of the thirty-six
foot buffer zone provision that applied to private property to
the north and west of the Clinic. 77 The Court found that the
patients and staff need not cross this area of private property
to access the Clinic, nor was there evidence that the protesters'
activities on the private property obstructed access to the Clinic or blocked vehicular traffic on the street.7S Because the purpose of the buffer zone was to protect Clinic entrances and
promote the free flow of traffic in front of the Clinic, the
Madsen Court held that this part of the provision burdened
more speech than necessary.79

2.

The Noise Level and "Images Observable" Provision

Next, the Madsen Court discussed the "noise level"80 and
"images observable" provision. S1 In assessing the reasonableness of such injunction provisions, the Court found it necessary
to consider the nature of the place to which the restrictions applied. s2 Relying on its opinion in NLRB v. Baptist Hospital,

76. [d. The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia's reliance on the videotape
to show that no factual findings existed supporting the second irijunction: "[T)he
state court was . . . not limited to Justice Scalia's rendition of what he saw on
the videotape to make its findings in support of the second irijunction." [d. The
majority pointed out that witnesses testified as to the relevant facts in a three·day
evidentiary hearing and the protesters themselves "studiously refrained from chal·
lenging the factual basis for the injunction both in the state courts and here." [d.
Thus, the majority found Justice Scalia's contention that no .factual basis supported the injunction to be without merit. [d.
77. [d. at 2528.
78. [d.

79. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
80. For other cases limiting noise that interferes with the rights of unwilling
listeners, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
81. This provision restricts protesters from "singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other
sound or images observable to or within earshot of patients inside the [c)linic
during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays."
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2528 (1994) (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla. 1993».
82. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 ("[T)he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations. .. that are reasonable. m
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972».
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Inc.,83 the Court acknowledged that medical facilities serve
the needs of ailing patients who particularly require an environment of peace and quiet. 84 Because noise control at medical facilities is crucial during surgery and recovery periods, the
majority concluded that the noise-level provision, which applied only during these critical periods, withstood a First
Amendment challenge. 85

The Madsen Court overturned the blanket ban on all "images observable," however.86 The Court reasoned that if this
provision was intended to prevent signs threatening to the
patients or their families, the trial court could have issued a
narrower restriction prohibiting threatening signs, instead of
the broad ban issued here. 87 The Court also found that the
images observable prohibition was not justified by the necessity of reducing stress and anxiety of persons inside the Clinic. 86 Because the Clinic could simply close its curtains, the
Court concluded that the. restriction burdened more speech
than necessary. 89
3.

The Three Hundred Foot No-Approach Zone

The Madsen Court also struck down the provision requiring protesters to refrain from physically approaching persons
seeking Clinic services within three hundred feet of the Clinic
"unless such person indicates a desire to communicate."90 Al-

83. 442 u.S. 773 (1979). The Madsen Court stated:
Hospitals, after all are not factories or mines or assembly
plants. They are hospitals, where human ailments are
treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principle facets of the day's activity,
and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful,
uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773,
783-84 n.12 (1979) (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978».
84. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
85.ld.
86. ld. at 2528-29.
87. See id. at 2529. See supra note 81 for prohibited conduct.
88. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529.
89.ld.
90. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994) (quoting Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 669 (Fla.
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though the purpose of this provision was to prevent patients
and staff from being "stalked" or "shadowed" while approaching the Clinic,91 the Court held that the provision was too
broad to serve these goals. 92 Peaceful, as well as aggressive,
approaches were prohibited. 93 Absent evidence that the
protesters' speech was independently proscribable (Le., "fighting words," threats, or words fus.ed with violence), the Court
found this prohibition to violate the First Amendment. 94 In
fact, the Madsen Court felt that the "consent" requirement
alone invalidated the provision, as it burdened more speech
than necessary to ensure Clinic access and prevent intimidation. 95

4.

The Residential Picketing Ban

The last substantive prOVISIon challenged by protesters
was the restriction against "picketing, demonstrating, or using
sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff."96 The Court overturned the sound amplification prohibition, concluding that the state may simply order
protesters to reduce the volume if it proves too disruptive to
the neighborhood. 97 The Court further rejected the three hundred foot residential picketing ban,98 finding it overbroad:

1993».
91. [d. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2701, 2708 (1992) ("(F]ace-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an
appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target
the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering
physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation.").
92. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529.
93. [d.
94. [d. ("[I]n public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even

outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment.") (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322
(1988».
95. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529.
96. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994).
97. [d. (citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (upholding time,
place, and manner noise restriction near a school)).
98. [d. at 2530 (citing Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law
banning targeted residential picketing». In Frisby, the Court characterized the
home as "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick." Frisby, 487 U.S.
at 484 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.s. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring».
The Madsen Court distinguished the ban in Frisby on the ground that it
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"[T]he 300-foot zone would ban 'general marching through
residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of
an entire block of houses.',,99
E.

CONCLUSION OF THE MAJORITY

The Madsen majority sustained the constitutionality of the
Clinic's thirty-six foot buffer zone and the noise-level provision,
finding that they burdened no more speech than necessary to
serve the injunction's goals. loo However, the Court struck
down the thirty-six foot buffer zone as applied to the private
property north and west of the Clinic, .the 'images observable'
provision, the three hundred foot no-approach zone around the
Clinic, and the three hundred foot buffer zone around residences. 101 The Court found that these provisions "[swept] more
broadly than necessary" to protect the state's interests. 102
Thus, the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed
in part and reversed in part. 103
was much smaller than the 300·foot zone struck down here and was limited to
"focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence." Madsen,
114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483).
99. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483). The Madsen
Court reasoned: "The record before us does not contain sufficient justification for
this broad ban on picketing; it appears that a limitation on the time, duration of
picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accomplished
the desired result." [d.
100. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994).
101. [d. The majority also rejected the protesters' challenge that the injunction
was vague and overbroad because it applied to those acting "in concert" with the
named defendants. [d. Because petitioners were named parties, the Court found
that they lacked standing to challenge the part of the order concerning those who
were not named parties. [d. The Court also found that the phrase, "in concert,"
was not overbroad because it did not prohibit conduct or chill speech, but was
merely directed at unnamed parties who might later be found to be "in concert"
with named parties. [d. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945)
(holding that a party subject to an injunction who was not a "successor or assign"
could not invalidate the order because it applied to "successors or assigns" of the
enjoined party).
The Court further rejected the argument that the "in concert" provision
violated protesters' First Amendment freedom of association, explaining that such a
freedom does not extend to joining with others in order to deprive third parties of
their lawful rights. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530. See Citizens Against Rent Con·
troVCoalition For Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (holding that
governmental limitations on contributions to support or oppose referendum elections violates the freedoms of speech and association).
102. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
103. [d. Justice Souter wrote a short concurring opinion to clarify two matters
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IV. JUSTICE STEVENS CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority concerning
two main issues. lo4 First, he disagreed with the majority's
new standard. Although Justice Stevens agreed that intermediate scrutiny was inappropriate for reviewing a First Amendment challenge to an injunction, he asserted that injunctive
relief should be entitled to a more lenient, not a more rigorous,
standard. lo5 Justice Stevens reasoned that, because injunctions only apply to individuals who have already engaged in
illegal conduct and are likely to repeat the offensive behavior,
courts need the latitude of a lenient standard to fashion injunctive remedies which will protect against repeated violations. 106

in the record. First, he explained that the trial judge made it clear that the issue
of who had been acting" "in concert" with the named defendants was a matter to
be "taken up in individual cases, and not to be decided on the basis of protesters'
viewpoints." [d. Second, Justice Souter pointed out that the protesters themselves
"acknowledge that the governmental interests in protection of public safety and
order, of the free flow of traffic, and of property rights are reflected in Florida
law." [d. at 2530-3lo
104. In addition to his two main points of disagreement, Justice Stevens also
objected to the fact that the majority addressed challenges to the injunction that
were not properly before the Court. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.
Ct. 2516, 2533 (1994). The certiorari petition presented three questions for review:
the first asked whether the 36-foot buffer zone was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction, the second asked whether the 300-foot buffer zone consent requirement provision was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction, or
whether it was an unconstitutional prior restraint, and the third question asked
whether the "in concert" provision violated the First Amendment. [d. at 2531 n.lo
Because the protesters only asserted a content-based challenge to the 36-foot
buffer zone, Justice Stevens felt the majority was wrong to modify the scope of
that zone, which was not an issue before the Court. [d. at 2533-34. Specifically,
Justice Stevens felt the Court should not have struck down the portion of the
zone on the north and west sides of the Clinic which the protesters did not even
challenge in their briefs. Justice Stevens believed that the Court should also have
refrained from deciding the constitutionality of the noise restrictions and "images
observables" provision, as neither of those issues were presented by the certiorari
questions. [d. at 2533-34.
105. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 253lo
106. [d. ("[E)ven when an injunction impinges on constitutional rights, more
than a 'simple proscription against the precise conduct previously pursued' may be
required; the remedy must include appropriate restraints on 'future activities both
to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences."') (quoting
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-98
(1978».
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Justice Stevens explained that ordinances require stricter
scrutiny than injunctions because legislation is imposed upon
an entire community, regardless of individual culpability.l07
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, a thirty-six foot buffer zone
that applied to an entire community would be much more
likely to violate the First Amendment than an injunctive buffer
zone that applied only to those previously engaged in unlawful
conduct. 108
Justice Stevens' second point of contention with the majority concerned the three hundred foot buffer zone. Justice
Stevens concluded that the majority incorrectly struck down
the buffer zone prohibiting protesters from physically approaching patients unless they indicated a desire to communicate. lOS Specifically, the provision provided that protesters
"shall not accompany ... encircle, surround, harass, threaten,
or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who choose
not to communicate with them."110
Justice Stevens characterized the three hundred foot buffer zone as a prohibition on a species of conduct, not a prohibition on speech.lll He stated that the protesters misread this
provision as creating a "no-speech" zone in which they were
prohibited from speaking absent consent from listeners.1l2 To
the contrary,Justice Stevens found that the protesters were
free to communicate with the public provided they did not

107. [d.
108. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2531 ("The judicial remedy for a proven violation of
law will often include commands that the law does not impose upon the community at large.") (quoting Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309-10 (1986». [d. at
2531-32.
109. [d. at 2532.
110. [d. at 2532 n.4.
111. [d. at 2532. Justice Stevens elaborated on his reasoning:
Petitioners' "counseling" of the clinic's patients is a form
of expression analogous to labor picketing. It is a mixture
of conduct and communication . . . . Just as it protects
picketing, the First Amendment protects the speaker's
right to offer "sidewalk counseling" to all passersby. That
protection, however, does not encompass attempts to
abuse an unreceptive or captive audience, at least under
the circumstances of this case.
[d. at 2532-33.
112. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2532.
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conduct themselves in an aggressive way: "As long as [the
protesters] do not physically approach patients in this manner,
they remain free not only to communicate with the public but
also to offer verbal or written advice on an individual basis to
the clinic's patients through their 'sidewalk counseling.'"113
Because he concluded that the buffer zone prohibited only
conduct while allowing a considerable amount of speech, Justice Stevens found the provision no broader than necessary to
serve the important state goals of reducing anxiety and hypertension in patients approaching the Clinic. 114 He therefore
would have upheld the three hundred foot zone around the
Clinic against the protesters' First Amendment challenge. u5
V. JUSTICE SCALIA CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART
A. THE PROTESTERS ENGAGED IN PROTECTED FIRST
AMENDMENT ACTIVITY

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in part but emphasized his points of disagreement in a lengthy and vigorous
dissent. us Justice Scalia began by attacking the majority's
fairness; he asserted that the abortion aspect of this case had
precluded the majority from engaging in an unbiased analysis
of the legal issues. ll7 Because Justice Scalia found the thirtysix foot buffer zone to be "profoundly at odds with our First

113. [d.
114. [d. at 2533.
115. [d.
116. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-51 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.).
117. [d. at 2535. Justice Scalia quoted Justice O'Connor's language from another
abortion-related case:
This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a
major distortion in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Today's decision goes further, and makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc
nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulations of abortion.
(quoting Justice O'Connor's dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986».
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Amendment precedents and traditions," he reasoned that it
was upheld only because of the majority's ad hoc, result-oriented analysis. 11s This biased analysis, argued Justice Scalia,
claimed the First Amendment as its victim. 119
Justice Scalia proceeded to describe a videotape entered
into the trial record by the Clinic containing footage of the
demonstrations. 120 Presuming that the tape revealed the
most aggressive activity justifying the injunction, Justice
Scalia concluded that the tape supported the protesters' case
more than the Clinic's.121 He described the video as displaying a wide range of First Amendment activity, expressed by
both pro-life and pro-choice activists. 122 Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that the video failed to provide evidence of
violence near the Clinic or attempts to prevent access to and

118. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535. Justice Scalia asserted: "The entire injunction
in this case departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence that in
any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for summary reversaL" [d. at 2534. Justice Scalia went on to explain the main reasons behind his
dissent:
Because I believe that the judicial creation of a 36-foot
zone in which only a particular group, which has broken
no law, cannot exercise its rights of speech, assembly, and
association, and the judicial enactment of a noise prohibition, applicable to that group and that group alone, are
profoundly at odds with out First Amendment precedents
and traditions, I dissent.
[d. at 2535.
119. See id. ("Today the ad hoc nullification machine claims its latest, greatest,
and most surprising victim: the First Amendment.").
120. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535-37. Justice Scalia explained that the videotape
was shot by employees and volunteers at the Aware Woman Clinic on three Saturdays in February and March of 1993, that the camera location appears to have
been an upper floor of the Clinic, and that the tape was edited down from approximately 6-8 hours to 112 an hour. [d. at 2535.
121. [d.
122. [d. According to Justice Scalia, the First Amendment activity displayed on
the videotape included:
[Slinging, chanting, praying, shouting, the playing of music both from the clinic and from handheld boom boxes,
speeches, peaceful picketing, communication of familiar
political messages, handbilling, persuasive speech directed
at opposing groups on the issue of abortion, efforts to
persuade individuals not to have abortions, personal testimony, interviews with the press, and media efforts to
report on the protest.
1d.
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from the Clinic. 123
B.

STRICT SCRUTINY Is THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR
SPEECH-RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS

Justice Scalia next took issue with the new standard announced by the majority.124 Although he agreed that different
standards should govern ordinances as opposed to injunctions,
Justice Scalia asserted that injunctions deserve an even stricter standard than that imposed by the majority.126 Justice
Scalia went so far as to state that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard. 126
Justice Scalia proposed three specific reasons why injunctions challenged on First Amendment grounds should receive
strict scrutiny. First, injunctions are susceptible to misuse by
judges favoring one side of a dispute and suppressing ideas of
the other side. 127 Second, individual judges, rather than legislatures, should not be trusted to impose injunctions, often on
those who have previously disobeyed the judge's order. 128
Third, injunctions are procedurally more difficult to challenge
than ordinances. 129

123. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535.
124. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2537-38 (1994)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy and
Thomas, JJ.).
125. [d. at 2538. Justice Scalia felt that the majority's new standard, although
it purports to be stricter than intermediate scrutiny, is actually little different
than intermediate scrutiny. Justice Scalia stated: "The Court does not give this
new standard a name, but perhaps we could call it intermediate-intermediate
scrutiny. The difference between it and intermediate scrutiny . . . is frankly too
subtle for me too describe." [d.
126. [d.
127. [d. Justice Scalia gave the example of a judge who enjoins picketing at a
labor dispute site. The judge knows he is enjoining the expression of pro-union
views and thus, his personal bias may be reflected in his court order. Unless it is
content-based, general legislation does not similarly target one side of a dispute or
another. ld. at 2538-39.
128. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Justice Scalia recognized that speech-restricting injunctions "are the product of individual judges rather than legislatures-and
often of judges who have been chagrined by prior disobedience of their orders. The
right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a single
man or woman." [d.
129. ld. at 2538. Justice Scalia explained that the collateral bar rule of Walker
v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), eliminated the defense that the injunction
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Justice Scalia stated that the majority asked the wrong
question in devising its new standard:
The real question in this case is not whether
intermediate scrutiny, which the Court assumes
to be some kind of default standard, should be
supplemented because of the distinctive characteristics of injunctions; but rather whether those
distinctive characteristics are not, for reasons of
both policy and precedent, fully as good as "content-basis" for demanding strict scrutiny.l30

As Justice Scalia explained, the dangers of censorship and
discrimination which require content-based legislation to pass
strict scrutiny are equally prevalent in injunctive orders; injunctions, therefore, deserve the same level of scrutiny.13l
Although Justice Scalia would apply strict scrutiny to
injunctions which are not content-based,132 he believed the
injunction here actually was content-based. 133 Justice Scalia
saw the injunction as discriminatory on the basis of beliefs
because it applied to "all persons acting in concert or participation with [the named individuals and organizations], or on
their behalf."134 Thus, he therefore viewed this clause as evidence that the injunction applied not just to conduct, but to
viewpoints and ideas as wel1. 135 According to Justice Scalia,

itself was unconstitutional. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Therefore, if people feel
that an injunction imposed upon them is unconstitutional, they must first challenge the injunction in court; if they disregard it, they are prohibited from later
claiming in a contempt proceeding that their First Amendment rights were violated. 1d. Thus, individuals lacking the resources to appeal an injunction must remain silent and forgo their freedom of speech rights, for if they ignore the injunction and speak, their First Amendment rights are no longer a defense. [d.
130. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538.
131. [d.
132. 1d. at 2539.
133. [d. In fact, Justice Scalia found the injunction to be viewpoint-based as
well because the injunction only targeted people with a particular viewpoint those opposed to abortion. [d.
134. [d.
135. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539. Justice Scalia further supported his position
by providing an account of an April 1993 hearing before the trial judge issuing
the injunction. The hearing concerned a number of arrests made for walking within the 36-foot buffer zone and contained the following exchanges:
Mr. Lacy: "I was wondering how we can-why we
were arrested and confined as being in concert with these
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even the issuing judge construed the "acting in concert or participation" provision to pertain to "all those who wish to express the same views as the named defendants. "136

people that we don't know, when other people weren't,
that were in that same buffer zone, and it was kind of
selective as to who was picked and who was arrested and
who was obtained for the same buffer zone in the same
public injunction."
The Court: "Mr. Lacy, I understand that those on
the other side of the issue [abortion-rights supporters)
were also in the area. If you are referring to them, the
Injunction did not pertain to those on the other side of
the issue, because the word in concert means those in
concert with those who had taken a certain position in

respect to the clinic, adverse to the clinic. If you are saying that is the selective basis that the pro-choice were not
arrested when pro-life was arrested, that's the basis of
selection. "
And John Doe No. 16 " ... I also understand that
the reason why I was arrested was because I acted in
concert with those who were demonstrating pro-life. I
guess the question that I'm asking is were the beliefs in
ideologies of the people that were present, were those
taken into consideration when we were arrested?. .

When you issued the Injunction did you determine that it
would only apply to - that it would apply only to people
that were demonstrating that were pro-life?"
The Court: "In effect, yes."
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing Trans. 104-05, 113-116 (Apr. 12, 1993 Appearance Hearings Held Before Judge McGregor, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Seminole
County, Florida».
136. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539-40. Justice Scalia also disagreed with the
majority's dismissal of prior restraint analysis for the injunction. Justice Scalia
asserted that "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest
threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint." Id. at 2541. Justice Scalia
pointed out that just last Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court: "The
term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur'. . .. [P)ermanent injunctions, i.e.,-court orders that
actually forbid speech activities-are classic examples of prior restraints." Id. (quoting Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993)) (quoting M. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03, p. 4-14 (1984) (emphasis added in Alexan-

der)).
In Madsen, the majority concluded that the injunction was not a prior restraint because it only restrained speech in a certain area and the basis for its
issuance was not content but prior unlawful conduct. See id. at 2524 n.2. Justice
Scalia felt these distinctions had no basis in precedent. See id. at 2541.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 4

568

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:543

C. EVEN UNDER THE MAJORITY'S NEW STANDARD, ALL
INJUNCTION PROVISIONS FAIL

Even applying the majority's standard, Justice Scalia
found the injunction offensive to the First Amendment. 137 He
explained the circumstances under which injunctions are issued: "[UJnder general equity principles, an injunction issues
only if there is a showing that the defendant has violated, or
imminently will violate, some provision of statutory or common
law."13S Because Justice Scalia found that the trial record
lacked factual findings that protesters engaged in behavior
violative qf the original injunction,139 he determined that the
amended injunction should never have been issued. 140 Justice
Scalia thereby concluded that the amended injunction necessarily burdened considerably more speech than necessary.141

137. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2544 (1994).
138. 1d. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953».
139. 1d. According to Justice Scalia, the majority accepted, without adequate
proof, the fact that the protesters violated the original iIijunction. Justice Scalia
stated:
The Court simply takes this on faith-even though violation 'of the original injunction is an essential part of the
reasoning whereby it approves portions of the amended
iIijunction, even though petitioners denied any violation of
the original iIijunction, even though the utter lack of
proper basis for the other challenged portions of the injunction hardly inspires confidence that the lower courts
knew what they were doing, and even though close examination of the factual basis for essential conclusions is the
usual practice in First Amendment cases.
1d. at 2545.
140. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548. Justice Scalia summed up his position as
follows:
The interests assertedly protected by the supplementary
iIijunction did not include any interest whose impairment
was a violation of Florida law or of a Florida-court iIijunction. Unless the Court intends today to overturn longsettled jurisprudence, that means that the interests cannot possibly qualify as 'significant interests' under the
Court's new standard.
1d.
141. 1d. Justice Scalia found that the only behavior conceivably related to a
violation of the original iIijunction included the incidental effects of persons walking in a picket line and leafletting on public property, behavior such as "causing
traffic on the street in front of the abortion clinic to slow down, and causing vehicles crossing the pedestrian right-of-way, between the streets and the clinic's parking lot, to slow down or even, occasionally, to stop momentarily while pedestrians
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Furthermore, Justice Scalia objected to the fact that the
trial court failed to use less restrictive alternatives regarding
the thirty-six foot buffer zone: "[T]here are surely a number of
ways to protect [the state's] interests short of banishing the
entire protest demonstration from the 36-foot zone."142 Justice
Scalia explained that the trial court could have ordered the
demonstrators to stay out of the street, limited the number of
protesters permitted on the Clinic side of the street, or forbidden pickets on driveways. 143 Moreover, he found the
majority's rejection of these options to mock the requirement
that restrictions "burden no more speech than necessary."I44
Regarding the "no-noise-within-earshot-of-patients" provision, Justice Scalia asserted that the "First Amendment ...
reels in disbelief."145 According to Justice Scalia, this provision is no more than a "judge-crafted abridgement of
speech."146 He argued that neither the majority nor the Florida Supreme Court ever attempted to link the "no noise" provision with any prior violation of law. 147 Because the trial record lacked evidence of the existence or violation of a law restricting noise near the Clinic, Justice Scalia found it impermissible for a single judge to impose his own self-created law
against a limited class of social protesters. 148 Justice Scalia
noted that the two cases 149 cited by the majority in support of
the noise restriction were distinguishable because each involved restrictions of general application; they were imposed

got out of the way." [d. at 2546. Justice Scalia felt that these results were not
intentional and that the original injunction did not intend to prohibit such incidental effects. [d.
142. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2548.
143. [d.
144. [d. at 2548-49. Justice Scalia complained that "[t)he Court's only response
to these options is that '[t)he state court was convinced that [they would not
work) in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect access' . . . . If the
'burden no more speech than necessary' requirement can be avoided by merely
opining that (for some reason) no lesser restriction than this one will be obeyed, it
is not much of a requirement at all." [d.
145. [d at 2547.
146. [d.
147. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547.
148. [d.
149. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979) (upholding generallyapplicable noise restriction near a hospital); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (upholding a generally-applicable noise ordinance).
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upon the public at large, not upon an isolated class of protesters. 150
VI. A CALIFORNIA CASE VACATED AND REMANDED IN
LIGHT OF MADSEN
Because the Madsen standard acts as a federal mandate
on courts nationwide, injunctions reviewed under the former,
intermediate standard may no longer be valid under the new,
stricter standard. The United States Supreme Court has recently vacated and remanded a number of state court decisions
involving injunctions at abortion clinics. 151 One of these vacated decisions is Planned Parenthood v. Williams. 152
In Williams, the California Supreme Court upheld an
injunction prohibiting protesters from demonstrating on a
public sidewalk in front of the abortion clinic. 15s Protesters
were therefore limited to demonstrating across the street,
which is where the thirty-six foot buffer zone in Madsen left
the Florida protesters. 154

150. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2547. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by lamenting the injustice engendered by the majority's decision and describing the
errors in its opinion:
The proposition that injunctions against speech are subject
to a standard indistinguishable from (unless perhaps more
lenient in its application than) the "intermediate scrutiny"
standard we have used for "time, place, and manner"
legislative restrictions; the notion that injunctions against
speech need not be closely tied to any violation of law,
but may simply implement sound social policy; and the
practice of accepting trial-court conclusions permitting
injunctions without considering whether those conclusions
are supported by any findings of fact-these latest byproducts of our abortion jurisprudence ought to give all
friends of liberty great concern.
[d. at 2549-50.
15l. Scott Graham, Abortion 'Buffer Zone' Ruling is Struck Down, THE RECORDER, Nov. 1, 1994, at 1. See, e.g., Lawson v. Murray, 130 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1994), vacating and remanding Murray v. Lawson, 624 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993).
152. 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994).
153. [d. at 1226.
154. The two cases are similar in other respects as well. In Williams, the California Supreme Court rejected the protesters' contention that the injunction was
content-based, giving the same reasoning and precedent found in the Madsen opinion. See id. at 1229-30. The Williams court also identified similar governmental
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The Williams court found that the injunction was contentneutral and accordingly applied the traditional, intermediate
standard appropriate for time, place, and manner regulations. 155 The California Supreme Court concluded, as did the
Florida Supreme Court when it analyzed the injunction involved in the Madsen case, that the injunction was narrowly
tailored to protect significant state interests and left open
ample alternative avenues of communication. 156 Nonetheless,
because the California Supreme Court used the intermediate
standard rather than the "burden no more speech than necessary" standard, the decision was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court and now must be reconsidered in light of
Madsen. l57
The sidewalk exclusion in Williams is similar to the thirtysix foot buffer zone upheld in Madsen; thus, the California
Supreme Court may find the facts in Madsen analogous to
Williams and reaffirm the injunction despite the tougher standard it must apply. However, one of the main issues in Williams revolved around the "narrowly tailored" requirement.
The protesters, as well as the dissenting opinion, urged that
the sidewalk exclusion was broader than necessary to serve the
state's goals. l5s The majority disagreed that such precise tailoring was necessary, relying heavily on Ward v. Rock Against
Racism. l59 Ward held that narrow tailoring is not synonymous with least restrictive means: "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest ... the regulation will not be invalid
simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative."l6o Contrary to Ward, Madsen's new standard requires that injunctions "burden no more speech than necessary," implying that if a less-speech restrictive alternative

interests as those held in Madsen to justify the restriction. Id. at 1231-33.
155. Id. at 1229.
156. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1233-36. The Madsen case was titled Operation
Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), when it was
before the Florida Supreme Court.
157. Williams v. Planned Parenthood, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994).
158. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1235, 1243-45.
159. Id. at 124. See Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
160. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1233 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 797, 800).
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exists, failure to use it would, by definition, "burden more
speech than necessary."161 Thus, Madsen seems to suggest
that the holding in Ward no longer applies to speech restrictive
injunctions.
Furthermore, the Williams court explained that intermediate scrutiny does not require "quibbling over a few feet. "162
The Madsen Court, on the other hand, emphasized that the
new standard's goal is "precision of regulation," requiring that
an injunction be "couched in the narrowest terms that will
accomplish its pin-pointed objective."163 Such language indicates that the Madsen Court takes the narrowly tailored requirement very seriously; loose-fitting regulations or even any
overbroadness appear impermissible under the new standard.
Because the flexibility depended on in Williams has since
been eroded by Madsen's more rigorous standard/64 and because Williams was a close case with a strong dissenting opinion,165 Williams will have difficulty withstanding a stricter
level of scrutiny. Nonetheless, Madsen has thus far only been
applied to its own facts. It is hard to predict exactly how lower
courts will interpret the new standard for injunctions and how
stringently they will apply it.
VII. CRITIQUE
A. THE NEW STANDARD HELPS PROTESTERS, HURTS ABORTION
CLINICS

The standard announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Madsen shifts the balance in favor of anti-abortion
protesters by requiring that injunctions against them withstand a higher degree of scrutiny.l66 Although Madsen upheld
the thirty-six foot buffer zone,167 the standard the Court de-

161. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994).
162. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1235.
163. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526 (discussing the standard applied in Carroll
v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)).
164. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
165. Williams, 873 P.2d at 1238·45 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
166. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994).
167. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
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veloped may portend trouble for other beleaguered abortion
clinics. Such clinics will now have to make stronger showings
of necessity in order to obtain or sustain protective injunctions.
In close cases, such as Williams, clinics which received an
injunction under the intermediate standard may lose the injunction when subjected to the new, stricter standard. 168
Consequently, women's reproductive rights may suffer.
While protesters benefit from the new standard, women's
rights advocates, clinic doctors and workers, and those seeking
clinic services have little to gain from this standard. Women
risk losing their injunctions and facing harassment, embarrassment, and fear in order to exercise their constitutionally
protected right to choose abortion.
B.

THE NEW STANDARD Is
RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTIONS

APPROPRIATE

FOR

SPEECH-

Although the Court's new standard may prove more difficult for pro-choice advocates, the reasoning behind it is sound.
The differences between statutes and injunctions support the
conclusion that injunctions require their own standard. 169 Injunctions, imposed by individual judges instead of legislatures,
carry greater dangers of discrimination and censorship. 170
Subjecting injunctions to a slightly higher level of scrutiny is
therefore justified.
When injunctions infringe upon First Amendment activity,
protesters' rights must be afforded higher degrees of protection. The First Amendment should take precedence, and incidental infringements on speech should be permitted only when
and to the extent necessary to protect the states' interests.
The new standard announced by the Madsen majority accomplishes this result; it allows courts to balance competing interests while prohibiting them from unnecessarily abridging

168. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526·30.
169. See supra note 57 for a discussion regarding the differences between in·
junctions and ordinances.
170. See supra notes 58·59 and accompanying tert for a discussion regarding
the dangers of injunctions.
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protesters' First Amendment rights. l7l
C.

THE NEED TO PROTECT ABORTION CLINIC ACCESS Is
INCREASING

Although protesters' rights deserve protection, the states'
interest in protecting clinic access should not be underestimated. Abortion, like free speech, is a constitutionally protected
right.172 Because pro-life protesters cannot lawfully prohibit
abortions, they often resort to tactics of intimidation, threats,
and even violence.173 Increasingly, abortion clinics have become targets for bombings, fires,174 and shootings,175 resulting in lost lives and extensive property damage.
Unfortunately, for women seeking abortion related services, aggressive anti-abortion crusades have proven effective in
hampering access to such services. 176 Recent statistics show
that 84% of United States counties are now without abortion

171. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523-26 (1994).
172. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources assembled the
following evidence of clinic violence: "From 1977 to April 1993, more than 1,000
acts of violence and more than 6,000 clinic blockades against abortion providers
were reported in the United States. Included were at least 327 clinic invasions,
131 death threats, 84 assaults, 81 arsons, 36 bombings, two kidnappings and one
murder." Bruce Fein, Free Speech Depends on the Speaker, TExAs LAWYER, July
25, 1994, at 24. Such clinic-related violence led to the enactment of federal legislation, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, (FACE). The statute
subjects persons to federal penalties for interfering with access to abortion clinics.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994).
174. Within the month of February 1995, six abortion clinics along the California coast suffered arson attacks. Dexter Waugh, Feds link {ires at 6 health clinics,
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Mar. 2, 1995, at AI. There have been a surge of attacks at clinics around the country, and the FBI is investigating the possibility of
a national conspiracy against abortion clinic providers. 1d. at A12.
175. On December 30, 1994, John Salvi killed two women and wounded at least
five other people at two abortion clinics in Brookline, Massachusetts.
In 1993, Dr. David Gunn, a Florida physician who provided abortions, was
shot and killed by Paul Hill, a man participating in anti-abortion demonstrations
at the Pensacola Women's Health Clinic. Rohter, Doctor is Slain During Protest
Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1993, at AI.
176. Fred Bayles, Abortion foes put choice on the run, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Jan. 7, 1995, at A1, A16. "Some 200 sites that provided abortion, mostly in
smaller rural and public hospitals, have halted the procedure in the last four
years in the face of the threat of violence, financial woes and political opposition."
1d. at A1.
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service providers. 177 Anti-abortion groups are largely responsible for this reduction, as well as for increasing costs for providers striving to keep services running. 178 Although rural
communities are the hardest hit, metropolitan areas may soon
feel an impact. 179
D. BALANCING THE INTERESTS

Under the new standard announced by the Madsen court,
evaluating the constitutionality of an injunction in the First
Amendment context essentially becomes a balancing test;
courts must balance whether a state's interest in protecting
clinic access is "necessary" enough to justify incidental infringements upon protesters' First Amendment rights. The
Madsen standard tipped the balance slightly in favor of protesters by allowing greater protection for their First Amendment rights. 180 On the other side of the scale, however, are
abortion clinics, whose need for protection, already strong, is
increasing.
Although the Madsen Court articulated and applied a
stricter standard, the Court nonetheless sustained the thirtysix foot buffer zone, finding that the state interest in protecting
clinic access was strong enough to overcome protesters' First
Amendment rightS. 18l Since Madsen was decided, the need to
protect clinic access has grown even stronger. 182 The decrease
in abortion service providers and increase in clinic related violence reveal the current vulnerability of abortion clinics. Although each case involving clinic access protection is ultimately fact-specific and must be judged on its own merits, these
177. See id. at AI, A16.
178. Id. at A16. The president of National Women's Health Organization, operator of nine women's clinics in eight states, estimated that her organization had
spent $1 million in security and legal fees since the early 1980's: "Its been a state
of siege for 10 to 12 years. The metropolitan areas are just realizing it now themselves." Id.
179. Id. Paul deParrie, editor of Life Advocate Magazine in Portland was eager
to claim victory for these developments: "There is no doubt the pro-life side is
winning . . . . The outlying communities have stopped doing abortions, and it allows us to concentrate on the hard-core abortion mills in the cities." Id.
180. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2523-26 (1994).
181. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527.
182. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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factors should weigh in favor of abortion clinics when courts
balance the competing interests, because they explain how
necessary clinic protection has become.
The new standard makes it slightly more difficult for clinics to obtain and sustain injunctions; nonetheless, if courts
properly acknowledge the continuing and increasing need for
clinic protection, buffer zone regulations will generally remain
constitutional despite the stricter standard courts must apply.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Madsen v. Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 183 the United
States Supreme Court created a stricter standard for examining the constitutionality of content-neutral injunctions and
applied that standard to sustain or strike down different provisions of the injunction. l84 The Court upheld the thirty-six foot
buffer zone surrounding the Clinic and the noise restrictions,
but overturned the "images observable" provision, the three
hundred foot no-approach zone, the thirty-six foot buffer zone
applied to the private property north and west of the Clinic,
and the three hundred foot buffer zone around residences. 185
Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court summed up the situation best when it stated:
While the First Amendment confers on each
citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it
gives the picketer no boon to jeopardize the
health, safety, and rights of others. No citizen
has a right to insert a foot in the hospital or
clinic door and insist on being heard-while
purposely blocking the door to those in genuine
need of medical services. No picketer can force
speech into the captive ear of the unwilling and
disabled. 186

183.
184.
185.
186.
1993).

114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
See supra notes 40·103 and accompanying text.
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla.
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The importance of the First Amendment remains undisputed; its fundamental guarantees of free speech and assembly
are the cornerstone of our democratic society. Nonetheless,
when "free speech" is used as a weapon to prevent others from
exercising their constitutional rights, appropriately tailored
iIijunctions can provide an essential tool in restoring rights to
their proper balance.
Jennifer Wohlstadter·

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996.
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